| Abstract |
When we see others, we also try to 'see' their unobservable states of minds, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. We carefully monitor others' actions, as we assume that those actions are outward manifestations of their internal states. Actors and observers can have divergent views on the cause of the same actions. Critically, it is often the observers' view that affects important decisions in social life, from deciding the optimal level of cooperation to judging moral responsibility and court's decisions. Thus, the judgment about intentionality and agency in others' actions determines the way in which the observer deals with the actor. The primate brain has two separate neural systems that function in understanding others' actions and intentions. The mirror system is activated by others' visible actions and predicts their physical consequences in goal terms, whereas the mentalizing system is primarily involved in the prediction of others' intentions and upcoming actions regardless of whether others' actions are directly observable or not. The functional roles of the two systems have sometimes been described as mutually independent or even oppositional. I propose a hypothesis that the two systems may collaborate closely for judging the sense of other-agency.
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